Proactive measures of governmental debt guarantees to facilitate Public-Private Partnerships project by Tserng, Hui Ping et al.
  
Corresponding author: Hui Ping Tserng 
E-mail: hptserng@ntu.edu.tw 
 Copyright © 2014 Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU) Press  
 www.tandfonline.com/tcem 
548
             
JOURNAL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 
ISSN 1392-3730 / eISSN 1822-3605 
2014 Volume 20(4): 548–560 
doi:10.3846/13923730.2013.801883 
 
 
 
PROACTIVE MEASURES OF GOVERNMENTAL DEBT GUARANTEES TO 
FACILITATE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PROJECT 
Hui Ping TSERNGa, Shih-Ping HOa, Jui-Sheng CHOUb, Chieh LINa, c 
aDepartment of Civil Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan 
bDepartment of Civil and Construction Engineering,  
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei, Taiwan 
cDepartment of Technology, Public Construction Commission, Executive Yuan, Taiwan 
Received 26 Jul 2011; accepted 20 Jan 2012 
Abstract. Governmental Debt Guarantees (GDGs) are often used to encourage involvement by promoters and financial 
institutions in Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) projects. However, even after demonstrating the bankability of a project 
and reducing debt cost, the success of the project may be prevented by the lack of long-term commitment from sharehold-
ers. Equity contributions by promoters in the project company may be recovered from earnings on short-term construction 
activities. Based on lesson learned from early PPP projects with GDG, the hold-up problem for government in the view of 
transaction cost economic (TCE) theory may worsen if the designed contractual structure does not adequately manage op-
portunistic behaviours from promoters. This study empirically examined the effects of a structured GDG mechanism with 
particular complementary measures applied in joint projects to develop the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations. A 
GDG game model was then applied to bridge the theoretical gap based on the Taipei MRT experience. The analysis shows 
that requiring the promoter to provide sufficient equity and ensuring the commitment of the lender to provide the loan are 
the appropriate proactive measures. This study demonstrates its practical value for policy makers by combining case 
study, TCE and game theory in contractual issues.  
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, transaction cost economics, game theory, finance, Governmental Debt Guarantee. 
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Introduction 
The role of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in provid-
ing public services has become a common alternative for 
policy makers around the world (Ock et al. 2005; Russell 
et al. 2006; Sungmin et al. 2009; Cheung et al. 2010; 
Tang et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2010). According to the 
Private Participation in Infrastructure Database 
(WorldBank 2010), investment commitments in PPP road 
projects grew from US$ 7 billion in 2005 to a new peak 
of US$ 16.7 billion in 2008. Solino and Vassallo (2009) 
also observed that private participation in metropolitan 
railroads through PPP method has gained the support of 
local government due to the large and burdensome up-
front investment costs. 
Although the public sector is risk-averse and tries to 
transfer most of risks to private in many PPP projects 
(Yuan et al. 2010), government support for such projects 
is common in both developing and developed countries, 
and is deemed as one of the critical success factors (Chen, 
Doloi 2008; Chowdhury, Charoenngam 2009; Cheung 
et al. 2010). The literature proposes several explanations 
for this governmental decision. However, past studies and 
practical cases demonstrate that the good intentions of the 
government support may be misused by the promoter due 
to moral hazard (Zhang 2005; Ho 2006; Chang, Ive 2007; 
Irwin 2007). As noted by the OECD (2007), “The public 
sector needs to realize that public guarantees of private 
commercial behaviour can affect not only the degree of 
risk allocation and the reporting of the investment as on 
or off budget, but, more importantly, it can greatly affect 
the incentives of the private sector to accomplish opera-
tional and administrative efficiencies.”  
Due to the highly diverse forms of government sup-
port, this study focused on the Governmental Debt Guar-
antee (GDG). Because the GDG is the key consideration 
of lenders when making loans to private promoters, it 
significantly improves the bankability of PPP projects 
(PPIAF 2009). However, implementing a GDG is a major 
challenge due to the increased financial exposure of the 
government.  
As Tang et al. (2010) argued when the government 
provides too much guarantee, it would be easy for the con-
cessionaire to get the benefit from the contract at the ex-
pense of the public. This side effect of GDG to the gov-
ernment is well known to the PPP experts, and a quick 
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solution according to their experience is to ask for a “suffi-
cient” equity investment from the promoter. Instead of this 
intuitional and empirical answer, a literature review reveals 
the rationales have not been systematically reviewed in a 
scientific manner. Subsequently, what level of equity in-
vestment shall be considered as sufficient (i.e. 20% or 
30%) to mitigate opportunistic promoter behaviour in the 
case of GDG has not been well examined. Few studies 
have proposed a practical and quantitative method for the 
determination of this minimum equity requirement from 
the government perspective. Moreover, what an aggressive 
role the lenders can request from the government perspec-
tive (as a debt guarantor) is also lack of discussion. Thus, 
more research should be designed to find such an answer 
to facilitate the success of PPP projects. 
Therefore, this study is aimed at exploring the pro-
active measures from the government perspective that 
could be embodied in the contractual arrangements 
among the government, promoters and lenders in a GDG 
to mediate counter party’s opportunistic behaviour and to 
enable a win-win-win situation. The scope of this GDG 
pilot study about promoter opportunism is limited to the 
construction phase since lessons learned from early pro-
jects suggest that the government can be taken advantage 
of easily by profit-oriented promoter’s behaviour in the 
construction phase as presented in the next section.  
This paper is divided into below sections. Following 
the introduction, a literature survey is performed to iden-
tify the rationale, potential benefits and problems of GDG 
in the scientific context of Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory. Next, the research design is briefly intro-
duced. The Assistive Financing Mechanism adopted by 
the Taipei City Government in twelve station PPP pro-
jects serves as a case study in Section 3. Section 4 applies 
game theory to extract valuable knowledge from the case 
study in a generic form and construct a novel GDG model 
of quantitative conditions that encourage promoter hones-
ty. Based on the empirical case and developed model, 
Section 5 presents feasible measures toward the promoter 
and the lender for harmonizing GDG provisions. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn, and managerial implications and 
suggestions for future study are given.  
 
1. Review of literature on Governmental Debt 
Guarantee  
1.1. Why GDG 
The importance of public support in promoting PPP pro-
jects successfully is well acknowledged among policy 
makers, industrialists and academics. For instance, public 
infrastructure mega-projects are usually associated with 
huge capital investments and cannot be financially free-
standing from user charge while maintaining sustainable 
fare policies (Devapriya 2006; Irwin 2007; Mandri-
Perrott, Menzies 2010). Other current challenges to suc-
cessful PPP project delivery include limited access to 
project finance markets in developing countries (Chen, 
Doloi 2008; Marin 2009), the bargaining outcome of best 
risk allocation (Medda 2007; Chowdhury, Charoenngam 
2009), and the preference of lenders and the private sec-
tor for financing strategies that mitigate political risk or 
financial risks (Devapriya 2006; Medda 2007). For ex-
ample, Xu et al. (2010) concluded that the top two risk 
groups of PPP highway projects in China were govern-
ment intervention and government maturity risk. Such 
public support may include equity investment, tax and 
customs reduction, minimum revenue guarantees, loan 
provision, capital subsidy and GDG (Zhang 2005; 
Wibowo 2006; Irwin 2007; Chowdhury, Charoenngam 
2009; Mandri-Perrott, Menzies 2010); and thus, facilitate 
the progress of PPP projects.  
Salman et al. (2007) observed that the common 
challenge for PPP decision makers is to answer the ques-
tion: “what are the conditions needed and steps to be 
taken to improve project’s viability?” That is because 
many Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects, one com-
mon form of PPP, failed to be completed or were sus-
pended because their prior feasibility studies were insuf-
ficient to conclude the viability of the entire undertaking. 
Furthermore, 21 significant factors which have a certain 
impact on the feasibility of any BOT project were identi-
fied and classified into three categories: legal and envi-
ronment, financial and commercial as well as technical 
aspects. Notably, expert opinions collected by their re-
search indicated that the financial and commercial cate-
gory of project viability factors is the most important 
(60.3%). 
Two recent studies (Carrillo et al. 2008; Chan et al. 
2010) reported that the difficulty of finding financial 
partners due to their limited interest is a key obstacle to 
PPP. Thus, the long and complex procurement process, 
from preferred bidder stage to financial closing stage, 
may cause substantial delays. Lenders with limited 
knowledge of PPP prefer other investment alternatives 
(e.g. bond issues) than giving loan to PPP projects unless 
their loan is well secured. Lenders clearly consider GDG 
the second most important factor (after economic viabil-
ity) in their decision to lend because it reduces their risk 
in PPP financing (Chiang, Cheng 2009). Even in the UK, 
which has a well-developed financial market, direct gov-
ernment support for debt is the preferred method for 
quickly implementing PPP in exceptional circumstances. 
After the global financial market was seriously impacted 
by the 2008 Financial Crisis, the UK government (HM 
Treasury 2009) temporarily intervened in PPP projects 
for which sufficient debt financing could not be raised on 
acceptable terms. Specifically, GDG strategy significant-
ly reduces the lender risk premiums associated with a 
loan and can increase the financial viability of the project 
(Wibowo 2006; PPIAF 2008; Tang et al. 2010); there-
fore, GDG facilitates timely delivery of PPP projects 
from the possible delay in loan acquisition.  
 
1.2. Problems caused by GDG in the view of 
transaction cost economics theory 
1.2.1. Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) was introduced by the 
publication of “The Nature of the Firm” by Ronal Coase 
in 1937. “Transaction cost” refers to the cost of using the 
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price mechanism or the cost of carrying out a transaction 
by means of an exchange on the open market. North 
(1990) proposed that the key transaction cost is the cost 
of acquiring information which consist of the costs of 
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being ex-
changed and the costs of protecting rights by policing and 
enforcing agreements. Williamson (1996) then proposed 
that all transactions between two parties involve hidden 
expenses called transaction costs based on the assumption 
that human beings are bounded rationality and sometimes 
display opportunistic behaviour.  
Briefly, any exchange between two parties is a 
transaction. Division of labour and specialization encour-
ages transactions in society (Dougma, Schreuder 2002). 
For example, completing the PPP project required coor-
dination among the government agency, promoter, de-
signer, contractor, lender, and operator. Each economic 
exchange between these participants represents a transac-
tion. From the TCE perspective, transactions occur across 
markets or within organizations (defined as hierarchies). 
Whether a transaction is allocated to the market or to a 
hierarchy is a matter of cost minimization. Notably, 
transaction costs should be considered because total cost 
is the sum of traditional production costs and transaction 
costs (Grunegerg, Ive 2000). Comparing the costs of 
managing transactions internally and externally may indi-
cate whether the goods or services should be produced in 
house (defined as hierarchy) or purchased on the market. 
The TCE also enables the design of an improved hybrid 
governance structure between market and hierarchy (e.g. 
different contracts or organizations) that reduces transac-
tion costs. The TCE provides a conceptual framework for 
enhancing economic performance by designing govern-
ance structures that reduce transaction costs. 
Dudkin et al. (2005) concluded that procurement-
phase (including bidding and contract negotiation) trans-
action costs comprise over 10 percent of the capital value 
of PPP projects. In post-contract stage, the likelihood of 
incomplete contracts usually increases in long and com-
plex PPP projects. Therefore, anticipating all possible 
events during the project lifetime is difficult. Some con-
tractual agreements designed to maximize ex-ante effi-
ciency may result in ex-post inefficiency since the value 
of the contract performance to the promise is lower than 
the cost of performance incurred by the promisor (Solino, 
Vassallo 2009). The opportunistic behaviours of individ-
ual parties trying to exploit a situation for their own ad-
vantage increase the potential for high transaction costs in 
the post contract stage of PPP projects, which is known 
as the hold-up problem (Zhang 2005; Ho 2006; Chang, 
Ive 2007; Irwin 2007; Ho, Tsui 2010). 
When two contracting parties enter the post-contract 
stage, both try to maximize their own profits by opportun-
istically exploiting unforeseen events that are not governed 
by the original contract. The party that tends to be disad-
vantaged is the one that has less bargaining power and is 
susceptible to the hold-up problem. This occurs because 
bargaining power is inversely related to the commit-
ments/investments of a party to that particular transaction 
(e.g. PPP project). In this inverse relationship, the so-called 
asset specificity problem is that the counter party can cred-
ibly threaten to terminate the transaction (project), which 
can cause a huge loss, especially if the value of alternative 
uses for the commitments/investments is relatively small. 
Briefly, hold-up refers to action by the counter party to 
exploit the situation and to appropriate the expected profit 
by threatening to walk away from the relationship.  
The model proposed by Chang and Ive (2007) cap-
tured the increased vulnerability of project owners in the 
post-contract stage when the initial requirements must be 
changed after signing the contract and when transaction 
costs are high. Specifically, when the owner issues a 
change order, the contractor tends to ask for a price high-
er than the general market price because the contractor 
knows that the owner is held up. The owner tends to ac-
cept the price demanded by the contractor unless the cost 
of acceptance exceeds the cost of any one of the follow-
ing: 1) the loss incurred by abandoning the work in pro-
gress; 2) the cost of switching to another contractor; or 
3) the cost of using dispute resolution mechanism plus 
the cost of settlement. To avoid delay and further costs, 
the owner usually prefers not to abandon the construc-
tion-in-progress, let alone switch contractors or use a 
dispute resolution mechanism. Therefore, the party with 
less bargaining power may take expensive measures to 
mitigate vulnerability to the hold-up problem, which thus 
increases transaction costs.  
In this discussion, governance structure refers to the 
GDG direct agreement among the government, the Pro-
ject Company funded by the promoters, and the lender. It 
determines the relationship between interested parties 
after a termination or threatened termination due to Pro-
ject Company Default. In this study, TCE is used to ex-
plore the proper governance structure (the direct agree-
ment) that harmonizes government transaction costs in 
PPP projects with GDG.  
 
1.2.2. Reduced cost borne by the promoter under GDG 
A PPP project is typically financed by a combination of 
equity and debt. Equity holders (Promoters) are entitled to 
share in profits but may only do so after lenders receive 
their due interest. In a winding up, they are entitled to the 
balance of the realized net assets after lenders have been 
paid; thus, promoters may get nothing in return for their 
investment in bad times. Therefore, the amount of their 
investment determines the value of their assets specific to 
the success of the PPP project in which they invested.  
Despite the benefits of GDG, the promoter’s long 
term commitment to the performance of PPP project with 
GDG shall be significantly reduced if the contractual ar-
rangement (i.e. governance structure) is poorly designed. 
Specifically, the construction profit-oriented behaviour by 
promoters is encouraged. Figure 1 shows that, when a PPP 
strategy is used in transportation construction projects, 
contractors and rolling-stock providers are often the pro-
moters in the consortium. Because they are the major Pro-
ject Company shareholders, the sub-contracts for construc-
tion work and equipment are normally awarded to them at 
prices above market prices due to the lack of open compe-
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tition (Ho, Tsui 2010). Such promoters are considered 
short-term investors (Zhang 2005) because their equity 
contributions to the Project Company are generally recov-
ered from earnings on construction activities.  
 
 
Fig. 1. A representatively contractual framework among stake-
holders in PPP 
 
The literature also indicates that such government-
backed projects often “deteriorate” because the promoter 
tends to exaggerate the debt-carrying capacity of the pro-
ject whereas the lender may not examine the project rig-
orously. The lack of due diligence often results in financ-
ing with a high debt-to-equity ratio, which enables short-
term promoters to undertake large construction activities 
with small equity contributions.  
Askar and Gab-Allah (2002) argued that a minimum 
(or reasonable) level of equity is generally needed to 
convince the lender that the project is creditworthy and 
therefore bankable and financeable. Bakatjan et al. (2003) 
later developed a program for optimizing the capital 
structure of BOT projects from the “promoter” perspec-
tive. That is Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), i.e. 
the ratio of annual cash available at hand to annual total 
debt service. Sungmin et al. (2009) presented a model to 
optimize the developer’s equity level for privately fi-
nanced infrastructure projects via Monte Carlo simula-
tion. Furthermore, an appropriate concession period can 
be deduced basing on the fuzzy simulation model pro-
posed by Ng et al. (2007) or the simulation-based ap-
proach proposed by Zhang and AbouRizk (2006). How-
ever, none of them has proposed a practical and 
quantitative method to the government for the determina-
tion of minimum equity investment from the promoter. 
 
1.2.3. Increased transaction costs borne by the 
government agency under GDG 
Abandoning a PPP project is rarely feasible because of 
the huge loss of socio-economic-political benefits. More-
over, to reap such benefits, the public sector always 
strives to complete the project and to provide the service 
on time. Thus, given the long duration and complexity of 
a PPP, both the cost of switching promoters and the cost 
of using dispute resolution mechanisms are higher than 
those in ordinary construction projects because of time 
constraints.  
Particularly, for a PPP project with GDG, the gov-
ernment immediately bears the huge debt liability should it 
choose to terminate the contract either after a promoter 
default or after an unforeseen event that is advantageous to 
the promoter. Therefore, as asset specificity increases, the 
transaction costs and the vulnerability of the government 
also increase. In a GDG without a well-designed govern-
ance structure, hold-up problem for the government agency 
is worse than that in an ordinary construction or PPP pro-
ject because the asset specificity of promoters is reduced 
whereas that of the government is increased. 
 
1.3. Real cases facing problems caused by GDG 
Indeed, whether to provide GDG in PPP projects is a major 
policy dilemma. One representative case is the Taiwan 
High Speed Rail BOT Project (THSRP). In the financial 
package proposed by the consortium (MOTC 2010), total 
capital investment was US$ 13.54 billion financed through 
equity (US$ 3.45 billion) and debt (US$ 10.09 billion). 
During contract negotiations, the government authority 
agreed with the consortium that no lender should lend 
money without a GDG. Thus, the direct agreement signed 
by the government authority, Project Company, and lend-
ers set the bailout cap at US$ 10.83 billion (Li 1998). The 
agreement for the US$ 10.74 billion loan to the Project 
Company was then signed. According to the government 
authority, the GDG for the THSRP was justified by the 
vast social and economic benefits expected from the pro-
ject. It avoided delays caused by switching to alternative 
procurement approaches. The internal and external values 
of early completion to the public clearly outweigh the con-
tingent government liability.  
However, controversy happened during the building 
phase. An official report by the Control Yuan, which is the 
highest auditing organization in the Taiwan government, 
indicated that a THSRP promoter undertook US$ 
854 million in construction work whereas its equity contri-
butions to Project Company were only US$ 139.5 million. 
Because the initial equity investment from the consortium 
members corresponded to only about 6% of the loan the 
Project Company eventually took out, it may give the 
members only a modest sum at risk, compared to construc-
tion profits they earned. Subsequently, the promoters were 
reluctant to inject any money when the government asked 
them to honour the contractual requirement of one-quarter 
equity. Eventually, this equity gap was invested by state-
owned companies and government-controlled banks. An-
other case is the railway guarantees in Russia (Irwin 2007), 
which encouraged Project Company managers appointed 
by the controlling shareholders to exploit the Project Com-
pany and the government agency by paying inflated prices 
to suppliers and construction companies belonging to con-
trolling shareholders. 
 
2. Research design 
The research framework of this study included “case 
study approach” and “game theory analysis”. Firstly, a 
series of Taipei Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station PPP 
projects with a particular GDG mechanism serve as the 
exploratory cases. These cases provide valuable insights 
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in dealing with the hold-up problem facing the govern-
ment in a GDG. However, where studies relied on case 
study only, the further application of their findings are 
usually restricted because contract arrangements are pro-
ject specific and sensitive to the different context of the 
host country. 
In this sense, following the findings from case 
study, the research process was continued by modelling 
the GDG on the basis of game theory. The advantage of 
introducing a game-theoretic approach, as noted by Aoki 
(2008), is the intuitively appealing and plausible notion 
that institutional interdependencies, coherence and ro-
bustness are considered analytically tractable rather than 
ad hoc presumptions. Notably, game theory serves as a 
vehicle to extract the underlying principles from the Tai-
pei metro practitioners’ experience; therefore, the con-
structed model is generic and can broaden its application 
scope to other types of PPP projects in other countries. 
Game theory can be defined as the study of mathe-
matical models of conflict and cooperation between intel-
ligent rational decision-makers (McCain 2004). It pro-
vides a systematic and conceptual framework for 
optimizing the strategy of a participant in response to the 
strategies of all other participants (Ho 2006). All players 
are assumed to be rational and self-interested in their 
pursuit of maximum payoff. There are two basic types of 
games: static games and dynamic games, in terms of the 
timing of decision making. In a static game, the players 
act simultaneously, meaning that each player chooses 
his/her action without knowing others’. On the contrary, 
the players act sequentially and observe other players’ 
actions in previous moves in a dynamic game. Because 
the promoters make the decisions on the sharing of 
knowledge after observing the GDG option taken by the 
government, the dynamic game will be used for model-
ling and analysis in this study.  
In order to answer what each participant will behave 
in this GDG game, the concept of “Nash equilibrium”, one 
of the most important concepts in game theory is intro-
duced. The Nash equilibrium is a set of actions that will be 
chosen by each player. In other words, in the Nash equilib-
rium, each player’s strategy should be the best response to 
the other player’s strategy, and no player wants to deviate 
from the equilibrium solution. Thus, the equilibrium or 
solution is “strategically stable” or “self-enforcing” (Gib-
bons 1992). In a dynamic game, the Nash equilibrium is a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which satisfies the 
sequential rationality required for the solution of a dynamic 
game. For more information about the game theory analy-
sis and its application, readers are suggested to refer to Ho 
et al. (2011) and Tserng et al. (2012). 
 
3. Case study 
3.1. Background of Taipei MRT station PPP cases 
After about 20 years development, the network of Taipei 
MRT lines that have been completed for commercial 
service is 106.4 km, with over 1.3 million passenger trips 
per day on average (DORTS 2011). In order to release the 
huge financial burden of the government during the con-
struction, property development around/above MRT sta-
tions was considered as a feasible solution to internalize 
the external benefit that results from investments in MRT 
system. Moreover, those stations can also be built by the 
property developers without the money coming from the 
government’s pocket. A dedicated regulation was estab-
lished (e.g. Regulation for the Development of Land Ad-
jacent to or Contiguous with MRT System) at the begin-
ning to form the legal basis covering related issues of 
planning, application, evaluation, land acquisition, land 
use, guarantee bonds, incentives, monitoring, etc. 
From the perspective of the Taipei City Govern-
ment, the ideal scenario for enhanced cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency is for landowners to offer land and for 
promoters to fund the integral planning, design and con-
struction of the MRT stations. This joint-development 
approach which belongs to the PPPs concept reduces the 
financial burden on the Government and applies the skills 
and knowledge of promoters, which may not be available 
from the public sector. Although this idea was imple-
mented, the results were disappointing. One major reason 
was that the promoters had difficulty obtaining loans 
because banks were unfamiliar with the novel proposal 
and were reluctant to make non-collateralized loans.  
Thus, the Taipei City Government proposed an assis-
tive financing mechanism, a particular form of GDG, in 
2003 after one year preparation and communication with 
promoters and bankers. As of the end of 2010, promoters 
in twelve station projects have used this mechanism to 
obtain more than US$ 898.9 million in loans as summa-
rized in Table 1. They are Muzha Station, Yongchun Sta-
tion (Zone 19), Yongchun Station (Zone 21), Houshanpi 
Station (Zone 25), Taipei Main Station (T 9), Xindian City 
Office (Zone 22), Qizhang Station (Zone 10, 11), Wanlong 
Station (Zone 10), Gongguan Station (Zone 11), Xingtian 
Depot (Zone 17, 18, 19), Xingtian Temple Station (Zone 5) 
and Xingtian Temple Station (Zone 7). 
The assistive financing mechanism used in these 
twelve station projects was selected as an exploratory 
case for the following two reasons: firstly, of these twelve 
projects, nine were successfully delivered while three are 
currently nearing completion. Until now, none has been 
terminated early, and, therefore, none has required a gov-
ernment bailout. The successful use of this assistive fi-
nancing mechanism confirmed its validity.  
Secondly, in order to insure that all participants fulfil 
their contractual obligations without failure, a trust organi-
zation is used which form a particular contractual complex-
ity beyond what is considered standard practice in PPP 
projects. As presented in Figure 2, the contractual frame-
work including “PPP Agreement”, “Loan Agreement”, 
“Direct Agreement” and “Trust Agreement” is more com-
plex than that of common PPP projects as presented in the 
upper part of the Figure 1 (without Trust Agreement).  
The results of the case study, which included a de-
tailed review of official meeting minutes and terms of di-
rect agreement and trust agreement, in conjunction with 
face-to-face interviews with basic-level and high-ranking 
officials responsible for establishing and implementing the 
assistive financing mechanism, are given below. 
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 2014, 20(4):  548–560 
 
553
Table 1. List of Taipei MRT station joint-development projects with assistive financing mechanism (until the end of 2010) 
# Line Joint-development Station Base Area (m2) 
Floor Area 
(m2) 
Total  
Investment 
(US$ million) 
Debt with  
GDG 
(US$ million) 
Actual  
Completion  
Date 
1 Wenshan-Neihu  Muzha Station 14,251 39,733 58.4 34.6 Under Construction 
2 Nangang  Yongchun Station (Zone 19) 2,448 23,627 18.6 16.9 31 May 2005 
3 Nangang  Yongchun Station (Zone 21) 4,512 37,633 35.9 29.6 6 Oct 2005 
4 Nangang  Houshanpi Station (Zone 25) 1,533 9,341 9.4 4.9 12 May 2006 
5 Danshui  Taipei Main Station (T 9) 21,374 244,717 395.0 292.4 24 Jul 2009 
6 Xindian Xindian City Office (Zone 22) 1,721 13,896 21.5 8.6 29 Oct 2004 
7 Xindian Qizhang Station (Zone 10,11) 7,900 89,735 140.1 73.1 9 Jan 2008 
8 Xindian Wanlong Station (Zone 10) 1,248 7,680 10.3 5.0 Under Construction 
9 Xindian Gongguan Station (Zone 11) 1,868 15,921 28.0 15.0 29 Dec 2005 
10 Xindian  Xingtian Depot (Zone 17,18,19) 92,561 405,695 652.7 394.5 Under Construction 
11 Luzhou  Xingtian Temple Station (Zone 5) 2,223 17,966 31.1 18.9 12 May 2009 
12 Luzhou  Xingtian Temple Station (Zone 7) 629 4,958 9.3 5.7 5 Jan 2010 
Total  152,267 910,903 1410.4              898.9   
 
 
Fig. 2. The contractual framework of Taipei MRT station PPP 
Project 
 
3.2. Introduction of assistive financing mechanism 
Figure 3 shows the implementation procedures for the 
mechanism. The Taipei City Government, the bank, and the 
promoter in the Project Company contractually agree to how 
their relationship would be affected by a termination or by a 
threatened termination after promoter default. Essentially, 
the Taipei City Government guarantees the loan to the Pro-
ject Company whereas both the bank and the promoter 
commit to the following complementary measures.  
If a promoter default leads to early termination of 
the PPP agreement in the construction phase (e.g. if the 
promoter cannot raise the required equity investment), the 
City Government “may” terminate the PPP agreement. In 
this case, the City Government must purchase the work-
under-construction at a “compensation payable” purchase 
price. After deducting a penalty for promoter breach of 
contract (30% of the agreed “compensation payable”, 
which is equal to total equity investment), the priority of 
the City Government is to repay the loan to the bank.  
Instead of terminating the PPP, the City Government 
“may” choose to fill the gap in promoter equity. The direct 
agreement requires the bank to continue disbursing the 
loan. Upon completing the construction work, the market 
value of the project should far exceed that at the time of 
promoter default due to lack of a liquid market for incom-
plete construction projects. This ensures the completion of 
the development project, which is the objective of the 
Government.  
The following clauses are added to the PPP agree-
ment to comply with the principles of the above direct 
agreement: 1) Project Company should entrust all sources 
of funds (equity from the promoter and loans from the 
bank) and rights to a trust organization; 2) the bank must 
be included as a beneficiary of the All Risk Insurance 
held by the Contractor. The insurance claim must be 
managed in an individual account and can be used to pay 
for necessary repairs or reconstruction of target projects. 
The above trust system has three advantages: 1) The 
promoter equity and the bank loan are managed in an 
individual account, which ensures that the Project Com-
pany uses the funds appropriately; 2) The actually cumu-
lative expenditures on the construction work are clearly 
identified, so compensation payable in the event of early 
termination is easily determined; 3) It prevents lender 
foreclosures or provisional seizures of the work under 
construction when the promoter has financial difficulties. 
Therefore, it limits interruptions of project progress. 
Limitations of this mechanism are as follows: 1) The 
City Government provides GDG in the construction phase 
only (no revenue guarantee in the operation phase). This 
mechanism can be considered a government assurance of 
completion. Fortunately, since the financial pressure on 
PPP projects is highest in the construction phase before 
revenue is generated, the limited scope of the application is 
appropriate in most cases. 2) Although GDG can reduce 
funding costs, complementary measures such as employ-
ment of the trust organization increase administration and 
monitoring costs. Therefore, the trade-off between capital 
costs and administration and monitoring costs should be 
carefully considered. From the perspective of promoters 
who can secure their own bank financing, GDG is inap-
propriate because it increases their costs. In the case of the 
Taipei MRT stations, promoters in about one-third (12 of 
39) projects have requested GDGs. 3) The government 
agency should consider this mechanism a last resort for 
project financing because the government agency must 
assume the debt in the worst-case scenario. A thorough 
evaluation is needed in the planning phase to confirm the 
financial feasibility and construction costs of the project 
and to minimize government risk.  
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*  The equity level is requested to be at least 30%. 
** Penalty for breach of MRT Station joint-development agreement is 30% of 
the compensation payable which is the lower amount between „planned“ 
and „actual“ expenditures on construction. 
Fig. 3. Implementation procedures of assistive financing mechanism of Taipei 
MRT station joint-development project 
 
3.3. Analysing the underlying principles of assistive 
financing mechanism 
The authors view this governance structure as a “condi-
tional” GDG. These complementary measures enable the 
government to balance hold-up and bargaining power 
when managing the construction profit-oriented behav-
iour of the promoter and to avoid inheriting the debt left 
by the promoter.  
 
3.3.1. Increasing the cost of the promoter  
The transaction cost of the promoter can be increased 
because the asset specificity of the promoter can be in-
creased in this governance structure. Several approaches 
are possible:  
Appropriately require minimum promoter equity: 
Promoter equity should be at least 30%. Additionally, the 
bank should only be allowed to disburse the loan after the 
promoter commits at least half of the agreed funding. 
Additionally, the disbursement of loans should be propor-
tional to the amount committed. The rationale is that 
promoters should kick-off the construction work with 
their own money. Unless the promoter provides 15% of 
total project capital, the bank loan can be used to inject 
funds proportionally. Regarding why a 30% equity level 
is required for Taipei cases, no concrete reason can be 
found in the documents. Is it too conservative or too 
risky? A scientific model will be introduced to bridge the 
empirical findings based on game theory in Section 4, 
and thus, the “appropriate” minimum equity requirement 
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can be determined not only in Taipei cases but also in 
other PPP projects.  
Meaningfully penalize promoter default: The agreed 
penalty for early termination caused by promoter default 
is 30% of payable compensation. The penalty ratio is set 
intentionally the same as the required equity ratio. If the 
City Government must take over the project, the invested 
funds by the promoter become a sunk cost; this increases 
the asset specificity of a promoter who is considering 
walking away from a project that is currently underway. 
Carefully determine the amount of compensation: If 
the promoter inflates the construction fee, the City Gov-
ernment overpays for the project. Thus, the amount of 
compensation payable upon early termination is deter-
mined by whichever of the following is lower: 1) Planned 
expenditures on construction: this amount is based on the 
investment execution plan approved by the City Govern-
ment and is the cumulative construction cost as of the 
time of early termination. 2) Actual expenditures on con-
struction: the trust organization must present receipts 
from all manufactures and contractors on behalf of the 
Project Company. A professional and independent third 
party should be commissioned for due diligence. Finally, 
these expenditures must be approved by the bank and the 
City Government.   
 
3.3.2. Reducing the transaction cost of the government 
agency 
The switching cost is usually the upper limit of the 
amount that the promoter can take advantage of the gov-
ernment in the event of ungovernable contingencies 
(Chang, Ive 2007). The government hold-up problem is 
reduced because the switching cost is better managed by: 
Against the promoter: The penalty for early termina-
tion due to promoter default is 30% of payable compensa-
tion. This amount should be sufficient for the government 
agency to find an alternative promoter. 
Against the banker: The direct agreement provides 
that the City Government can fill the funding gap when 
the promoter encounters financial difficulties and that the 
bank must disburse the loan continuously. Thus, the gov-
ernment avoids the immediate budgetary burden of pay-
ing out the promoter debt. Moreover, the direct agree-
ment should ensure that the interest rate from this point 
should be lower than that for the promoter.  
 
4. The GDG game 
4.1. Model setup 
The two participants in this game are the Government 
(GOV) and the Promoter, and the GDG is the security 
package required by the lender. Accordingly, GOV must 
first determine whether to provide the GDG. The strategic 
choices of the Promoter are either honour (by performing 
the PPP agreement in good faith) or exploit (by hold-up 
or other opportunistic behaviours). When analysing hold-
up coupled with construction profit-oriented intention, the 
associated business of the Promoter is assumed to be 
relevant to that PPP project (e.g. the contractor or equip-
ment provider). Meanwhile, the sub-contracts are award-
ed to the business associates of the Promoter.  
In this sequential game, the GOV moves first, and 
Promoter observes the GOV action before choosing a 
strategy. Figure 4 shows the extensive form. Suppose that 
early termination after Promoter default occurs in the 
construction phase. The GOV then takes over the project 
after providing compensation (denoted by EV) to the 
Promoter, and the Promoter is liable for the agreed penal-
ty, which is equal to the equity level (α). Eqn (1) formu-
lates the relationship, where AC = the actual cost of con-
struction work performed, i.e. total costs incurred by the 
contractor to complete work during a given time period; 
EV = the earned value, also called the budgeted cost of 
construction work performed, i.e. total expenditures paid 
by the Project Company to the contractor during a given 
time period; RCP = reasonable construction profit margin 
when an open tendering procedure is used; κ = inflated 
construction profit margin resulting from limited tender-
ing procedure in which only one contractor is invited to 
tender an offer for the construction work. Basically, AC 
and EV used above are drawn from (PMI 2004): 
 EV = AC (1 + RCP + κ). (1) 
Other abbreviations are used in the model: α = equi-
ty level, equity = α × EV, and debt finance = (1 – α) × 
EV; NPV = the expected net present value of the PPP 
project; β = the ratio of project value shared by GOV to 
NPV, which is decided through open competition of that 
PPP project; r = interest rate of the debt (since the debt is 
guaranteed by GOV, where r should approximate the 
nominal yield of bond depending on the GOV’s credit-
worthiness); G = the smallest GOV subsidy needed to 
persuade the lending bank to continue supporting a pro-
ject after Promoter default; τ = opportunity cost for the 
GOV to replace the promoter, which may include the 
retendering cost and the cost of interruption due to the 
bankruptcy and retendering process; λ = cost of adminis-
tering GDG. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The extensive form of GDG game 
 
4.2. Propositions and discussions 
Proposition 1: Where ( )
11 1 (1 )r RCPα > − − + + κ  the 
dominant strategy for the Promoter is to honour the con-
tract when GOV chooses to provide GDG.  
Proof: A dominant strategy is the strategy that is the best 
response to all possible strategy choices of all the other 
players (Carmichael 2005). By direct verification, Pro-
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moter chooses the “honour” strategy only if it yields a 
higher payoff compared to “exploit”. That is: 
 AC(RCP + κ) – αEV – r(1 – α)EV < (1 – β)NPV. (2) 
Since GOV and Promoter never promote a project 
with negative NPV, replace NPV = 0 (the worst case for 
GOV) in Eqn (2):  
then  AC(RCP + κ) – αEV – r(1 – α)EV < 0; (3) 
 AC(RCP + κ) – αEV – rEV + r α EV < 0;  (4) 
 AC(RCP + κ) – rEV – α (1 – r)EV < 0, (5) 
then  α(1 – r) EV > AC(RCP + κ) – rEV,  (6) 
substitute Eqn (1) into Eqn (6):  
then  ( )
11 1 (1 )r RCPα > − − + + κ (Q.E.D.). (7) 
Discussion: Since the contingency is that GDG is provid-
ed, the rational Promoter maximizes the payoff. The pre-
ferred Promoter response, honour or exploit, depends on 
which yields the higher payoff. The GOV is suggested to 
think strategically and to anticipate how a Promoter 
would respond to the offer of a GDG. In short, Eqn (7) 
indicates the best protective measure for the government 
even when NPV equals 0. The government should request 
an equity level appropriate for the given values of r, RCP 
and κ. The outcome (Eqn (7)) of the game proposed in 
this study can supplement the theoretical gap in the case 
study, which is based on expert rules of thumb. The sim-
plified formulation applied to the Taipei MRT station 
experience can be expanded to other PPP projects across 
different infrastructure sectors. 
Proposition 2: Suppose that Proposition 1 holds and that 
G, τ, λ, and r = 0 for GOV The subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium for GOV and Promoter is (Provide, Honour).  
Proof: A Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect if the 
player strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame (Gibbons 1992). The authors solve this game by 
backwards induction as follows. Because Proposition 1 
holds, the unique solution for the Promoter optimization 
problem in the second stage of the game is honour. Since 
GOV can anticipate the Promoter reaction to each GOV 
action at the first stage, the GOV must decide how to 
maximize its payoff. Briefly, the “provide” strategy shall 
be a dominant strategy if it yields a higher GOV payoff 
compared to the “not provide” strategy. Since βNPV [the 
corresponding payoff for GOV for (provide, honour)] 
exceeds 0 [the payoff for GOV at not provide], provide 
must be the dominant strategy for GOV if AC – (1 – α) 
EV – G – τ – λ [the payoff for GOV at (provide, exploit)] 
is no less than 0 [the payoff for GOV at not provide]. 
Because Proposition 1 holds, Eqns (1) and (7) above are 
substituted into Eqn AC – (1 – α)EV – G – τ – λ; moreo-
ver, if G, τ, and λ = 0, then: 
Payoff GOV= 11 (1 )r− − . (8) 
If r = 0, then Payoff GOV = 0 (i.e. provide is the domi-
nant strategy for GOV). 
Therefore, the backwards-induction outcome of this 
game is (provide, honour) with the corresponding payoffs 
[βNPV, (1 – β)NPV]. Further, in this two-stage game of 
complete and perfect information, the backwards-
induction outcome is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibri-
um defined by Gibbons (1992) (Q.E.D.). 
Discussion: The assumptions in Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2 protect the GOV from the pitfalls of a 
GDG. The exploratory cases demonstrate a practical ap-
plication of these theoretical assumptions. The direct 
agreement commits the lending bank to disbursing the 
loan only if the City Government chooses to step in (G = 
0). Additionally, the Promoter penalty is equal to the 
project equity (30%), which should adequately compen-
sate the City Government for the total costs of replacing 
the promoter, administering the government guarantee, 
and paying the interest on the debt (τ, λ, and r = 0, re-
spectively). If the lender or promoter declines to commit, 
GOV has no dominant strategy because its payoff from 
“provide” may be smaller than that from “not provide”. 
Thus, the game may be terminated, meaning both the 
participants and the lender leave with “zero” payoff. To 
obtain a win-win-win outcome (i.e. [βNPV, (1 – β)NPV, 
r(1 – α)EV]) among GOV, Promoter and the lender, the 
best response by the three participants is agreeing to the 
above complementary measures because the payoff ma-
trix of this cooperative solution outweighs that of non-
cooperation.  
 
5. Suggested proactive measures and applications 
According to the literature, case study and theoretical 
model, the transaction cost resulting from asset specifici-
ty for the government, the promoter and the lender can be 
balanced concurrently in GDG by a properly designed 
governance structure. The government should request all 
participants to commit to the project unanimously. The 
payoff matrix (i.e. [βNPV, (1 – β)NPV, r(1 – α)EV] 
among GOV, Promoter and the lender) for this coopera-
tive solution shows that the bonding arrangement under 
the proposed scheme benefits all participants.  
1. Requesting sufficient promoter equity 
In accordance with proven proposition 1 and inno-
vative Eqn (7), the sufficient equity level of the promoter 
should be required by the government can be calculated 
based on r, RCP and κ. The value of r (the interest rate of 
the debt) can be set to the nominal yield of government 
bonds. That is because they are guaranteed by the gov-
ernment as well. In this case, the default risk of the debt 
perceived by the lenders should be similar to that of the 
government bond. Therefore, a similar risk premium is 
required. The value of RCP can be set to the average 
profit margin of listed companies whose main business is 
relevant to the construction work, such as building con-
tractors, civil engineering contractors, design-build firms, 
etc. The value of κ can set to the average ratio of tender 
awarding value to budget value in previous government 
procurement projects. The GOV can also apply the cost 
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estimation tools and techniques proposed in the PMBOK 
Guide (PMI 2004), including analogous estimating, par-
ametric modelling, bottom-up estimating, and computer-
ized tools, in order to estimate κ accurately. Table 2 is a 
minimum equity level matrix for r = 2%. For example, if 
RCP and κ equal 10% and 30%, respectively, the gov-
ernment should require minimum promoter equity of 
27%. The proposed equation is not only practicable for 
policy makers but also scientifically proven as a self-
enforcing Nash equilibrium which can avoid the subjec-
tive or intuitional determination based on rules of thumb. 
 
Table 2. Matrix of equity levels (α) by reasonable construction 
profit margin (RCP) and inflated construction profit 
margin (κ) with fixed interest rate 
α (%) 
(r = 2%) 
κ (%) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
RCP 
(%) 
10 7 15 22 27 32 36 40 43 46 49 51 
20 15 22 27 32 36 40 43 46 49 51 54 
30 22 27 32 36 40 43 46 49 51 54 56 
 
The detailed contract arrangements drawn from the 
exploratory cases can then be considered in line with the 
characteristics of each PPP project application. For ex-
ample, the penalty for breach of contract can be based on 
the required minimum equity level; the payable compen-
sation can be set to planned or actual expenditure, which-
ever figure is lower. The Project Company should also 
entrust its funds and rights to a trust organization through 
the trust agreement.  
2. Preventing lender withdrawal 
Proposition 2 which has been proven suggests that 
measures complementary to a GDG should manage the 
government’s cost of persuading the lender to continue 
supporting a project after promoter default (G). Since it 
must pay out the secured debt immediately, the govern-
ment is vulnerable to a lender exercising its power to 
withdraw funds. The detailed contractual structure in the 
case study shows that, if the government chooses to take 
over a project, the lender should be obligated to continue 
providing the loan. The interest rate should also be de-
termined in advance. 
 
Conclusions 
The public sectors should refine their strategies for deliver-
ing better Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) projects by 
reviewing empirical cases and theoretical foundations giv-
en the fact that PPP is now used to finance infrastructure 
projects worldwide. In order to prevent the financial 
bailout of the government from the promoters’ opportunis-
tic behaviour in a Governmental Debt Guarantee (GDG) 
PPP project, this study used case study and game theory 
for developing generic and proactive measures for the 
government that complement GDG in the construction 
phase. This generic GDG model and suggested proactive 
measures have been proven based on game theory as a self-
enforcing Nash equilibrium. This model can bridge the theo-
retical gaps in the case study and broaden its application.  
Contractual arrangements for two proactive 
measures against to the promoter and the lender respec-
tively are proposed to enable policy makers to mitigate 
their financial exposure risk in GDG. The authors pro-
pose an innovative and practicable equation for quantita-
tively calculating the minimum equity level of the pro-
moter should be requested by the government in response 
to r (interest rate of the debt), RCP (reasonable construc-
tion profit margin through open tendering procedure) and 
κ (inflated construction profit margin resulting from lim-
ited tendering procedure). The government should require 
the promoter to meet this minimum equity level. Instead 
of requiring the government to pay out the secured debt 
immediately, the contract should also require the lender 
to continue providing the loan if a government takeover 
occurs after promoter default. 
According to transaction cost economy (TCE), the 
suggested measures complementary to GDG can harmo-
nize the transaction costs of the government agency. 
However, both the transaction costs of the promoter and 
the lenders resulting from asset specificity increase con-
currently. Briefly, the proposed governance structure is a 
mutual hold-up structure. Since all parties involved in-
crease their commitments, the proposed contractual ar-
rangements give all parties an incentive to make the pro-
ject work by placing their investment at risk. Notably, 
GDG is one out of many types of government supports 
for PPP. All participants should recognize the pros and 
cons of each type of government support; and further-
more, choose the proper type of government support ac-
cording to the attributes of each project.  
The findings of this study are valuable for both PPP 
experts and researchers. In practice, the conceptual idea 
that a minimum equity investment is essential to the suc-
cess of a PPP project based on rules of thumb has been 
enhanced with scientific rigorousness. Experts can deter-
mine a specific ratio about what quantitative level is suf-
ficient to protect the government from the opportunistic 
behaviour of the promoter. Moreover, the role of the 
lenders can be also taken into consideration in a GDG 
case. Properly bridging the theoretical gap would provide 
them with comprehensive knowledge and the capability 
to apply the findings and suggestions in the case study to 
specific contexts in their own countries.  
Academically, the valuable experience distilled 
from the case study approach is interpreted in light of the 
TCE. Subsequently, the game theory methodology is 
adopted. Unlike superficial reasoning based on intuition, 
the game equilibrium view of GDG as well as case study 
evidence convincingly support the conclusions of this 
study. The proposed methodologies and research flow for 
combining case study, TCE and game theory provide 
researchers in construction field a useful tool for analys-
ing similar contractual issues. Future studies may apply 
the proposed methodologies and research flow for in-
depth analysis of opportunistic promoter behaviour in the 
operation phase of PPPs with GDG. Such studies could 
reveal measures complementary to GDG in different 
stages of a PPP life cycle. 
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